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Abstract
Since The Permanent Court of Arbitration issued its award on 12 July 2016 it have raised many 
controvertion.  Almost all Submissions are decided in favour of the Philippines. The Award, as 
expected by many scholars, is not intended to solve the core dispute of the South China Sea ‘what 
maritime features belong to whom’, since the very nature of this kind of dispute is not under the 
Tribunal competence. The sovereignty over disputed features shall be left to the claimant States for 
the resolution. Nevertheless, the Tribunal Award has not only clarified the dispute but also partially 
solve the core dispute. The legal clarification is expected to contribute to future negotiations among 
the claimant States concerning the core (sovereignty) dispute.  This Article attempts to identify and 
describe what has been changed by the Tribunal Rulings and what has been solved. The implication 
of the Ruling on Indonesia’s legal interest is also briefly discuss.
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The South China Sea dispute is a complex and proliferated dispute. 
The dispute is mainly about,  and rooted in,  overlapping claim over 
maritime features (islands, rocks, reefs)  in the South China Sea by six 
countries bordering the South China Sea1 i.e. China (including Taiwan), 
Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei and the Philippines. The dispute starts  since 
WW II but it has been since 1960 that the respective claim of the claim-
ant states have been known to each other. China claims all the Spratly 
Islands based on historical discovery and control. Taiwan mirrors Chi-
na’s claim with some modifications. Vietnam also claims all the Spratly 
Islands based on historical discovery and colonial French inheritance. 
The Philippines claims some islands based on proximity and discovery/
* The author graduated from Goethe University of Frankfurt and is currently the Sec-
retary of Directorate General for Legal and Treaties Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Af-
fairs, Indonesia. This Article is purely his academic view.
1 Many books and articles have been written about the dispute. The most popular and 
recent one is writen by Bill Hayton, South China Sea: the Struggle for Power in Asia, 
Yale University,  2014. Overview about this book has been written by Damos Dumoli 
Agusman, Kompas, 22 November 2015. 
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occupation but has abandoned its claim on the basis of ‘Paris Treaty 
Box’. Malaysia claims some islands based on proximity.2
On 12 July 2016, Arbitral Tribunal Constituted Under Annex VII to 
the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea between the 
Philippines and China (hereafter called “Tribunal’)  issued a landmark 
Award concerning the South China Sea dispute. The Case was launched 
on 22 January 2013 when the Philippines instituted arbitral proceedings 
under Article 287 and Annex VII UNCLOS. The case brought by the 
Philippines in respond to the incident in 2012 where Chinese official 
vessels prevented by use of force the Philippines fishermen from enter-
ing Scarborough Shoal. 
The Case was defined in a cautious manner so that it only dealt 
with three inter-related matters in the form of 15 Submissions. First is 
about the legality under the UNCLOS 1982 of China’s claims based 
on “historic rights” encompassed within its so-called “nine-dash line”. 
Second, the maritime status under the Convention of certain maritime 
features claimed by both China and the Philippines, whether they  are 
properly characterised as islands, rocks, low tide elevations, or sub-
merged banks. Third, the activities of China by construction and fishing 
has interfered with the exercise of the Philippines’ sovereign rights and 
freedoms and have harmed the marine environment.
From the outset China strongly has objected the Philippines legal 
move.  On 19 February 2013, China has reiterated that it will neither 
accept nor participate in the proceedings, by arguing that the Arbitral 
Tribunal does not have jurisdiction over the case. On 7 December 2014, 
China issued the Position Paper for its legal defence.3 In the Position 
Paper, China stated that in regard with the South China Sea, China and 
the Philippines have agreed, through bilateral instruments and the Dec-
laration on the Conduct (DOC)4 on Parties in the South China Sea, to 
2  For a clear description of the respective claim see, Beckman, the UN Condntion on 
the Law of the Sea and the Maritime Dispute in South China Sea, 107 Am. J. Int’l L. 
142 2013.  
3  Position Paper of the Government of the People’s Republic of China on the Mat-
ter of Jurisdiction in the South China Sea Arbitration Initiated by the Republic of 
the Philippines, 7 December 2014, available at http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/
zxxx_662805/t1217147.shtml.
4  Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC), adopted on 
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settle their  relevant disputes through negotiations. In China’s view, by 
unilaterally initiating the arbitration, the Philippines has breached its 
obligation under international law. Further, China also argued that the 
case is about sovereignty and maritime delimitation for which China 
has made declaration under Article 2985 of UNCLOS 1982 for the ex-
cluding this kind of dispute from compulsory dispute settlement. China 
to some extend also revealed, albeit in ambiguous manner,  its legal 
position on the meaning of its controversial claim/historic rights on the 
basis of 9 dash line.
China’s respond is unprecedented.  China, which previously pre-
ferred to remain silent and ambiguous in term of its legal position to-
ward the issue, has since then moved out from its silence and increas-
ingly reveals not only its official position but also the legal foundation 
underlining its maritime claim. In the same time Chinese scholars come 
out with abundant legal argument in the language of international law 
which tried to clarify the claim.
The Tribunal has carefully examined the China’s objections and 
held public hearing in the jurisdiction and admissibility phase. On 29 
October 2015 the Tribunal issued the Award on this matter and decided 
that it has jurisdiction. According to the Tribunal, most of the Philip-
pines submission are disputes concerning the interpretation and appli-
cation of the Convention. They do not constitute a dispute concerning 
sovereignty over the feature, which would remain entirely unaffected 
by the Tribunal’s determination, nor is this a dispute concerning sea 
boundary delimitation for which are covered by the exclusion from ju-
risdiction under Article 298 of the Convention. There are a number of 
Submission6 that the Tribunal reserved its decision on the jurisdiction 
for consideration in conjunction with the merits.
4 November 2002, by ASEAN member States and China at the 8th ASEAn Summit 
in Phnom Penh. The 2002 DOC contains provisions on the following: (1) peaceful 
resolution of the territorial and jurisdictional disputes; (2) self-restraint in the conduct 
of activities that would complicate or escalate disputes and affect peace and stability; 
(3) confidence-building measures; and (4) cooperative activities.
5  Article 298 of UNCLOS 1982 provides Optional exceptions to applicability of sec-
tion 2. The dispute concerning maritime delimitation may, upon declaration by the 
Party, be excepted from compulsory procedure.
6  Submission 1 and 2 on historic rights claimed by China. 
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 Further, the Tribunal confirmed on the basis of Article 9 Annex VII 
of the Convention that the non appearance of China before the Arbitral 
Tribunal shall not constitute a bar to the proceedings. Interestingly, de-
spite the fact that China did not sit before the bench, the Tribunal has 
regarded whatever China’s official statements outside the Court rooms 
as official responds that constituted rebuttal to the Philippines submis-
ions. Thus these statements were fully considered by the Tribunal in its 
deliberation and decisions.
On 12 July 2016, the Tribunal issued its final Award. Almost all 
Submissions are decided in favour of the Philippines. The Award, as 
expected by many scholars, is not intended to solve the core dispute 
of the South China Sea i.e. ‘what maritime features belong to whom’, 
since the very nature of this kind of dispute is not under the Tribunal 
competence. The sovereignty over disputed features shall be left to the 
claimant States for the resolution. 
Nevertheless, the Tribunal Award has not only clarified the dispute 
but also partially solve the core dispute. The legal clarification is ex-
pected to contribute to future negotiations among the claimant States 
concerning the core (sovereignty) dispute.  This Article attempts to 
identify and describe what has been changed by the Tribunal Rulings 
and what has been solved. The implication of the Ruling on Indonesia’s 
legal interest is also briefly discussed.  
II. LEGAL CLARIFIED FACTS
A. THE CONTROVERSY OF SO-CALLED “HISTORIC RIGHTS” 
WITHIN 9 DASH LINE
The dispute becomes more exacerbated when China starts embrac-
ing in its legal argument the ambiguous concept of ‘9-dashed lines’, 
through which China is aggressively asserting “indisputable sovereign-
ty” to all the islands and waters enclosed by the lines.  China’s so-called 
“9-dash-line” (originally “11 dashes”) first promulgated by Republic of 
China in 1947.  No record has shown that the map has been officially 
known to pubic debated until 1990’s. Nor did it become China’s argu-
ment in supporting its claim during incident with Vietnam in 1974 or 
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during the UN Conference on the Law of the Sea.  In 1993 during the 
Workshop on Managing Conflict in South China Sea held in Surabaya, 
the Chinese delegation distributed a map showing the 9 dash lines and 
since then the mysterious map becomes subject to controversial debate 
among scholars and commentators around the world.7 Amidst its con-
troversy, China for the first time officially attached this map in its note 
to the Commission on the Limits of Continental Shelf in 2009, protest-
ing the join submission of Malaysia and Vietnam about their extended 
continental shelf to the Commission. In 2012 China issue its passports 
showing the illustrative map.
The Tribunal held public hearing on the merits of the case from 23-
30 November 2015 and dealt with the controversial question concern-
ing the legality of China’s claim concerning historic rights within the 
China’s  9 dash lines. At the first observation by many, it was suggested 
that the Tribunal might have difficulty in determining its legality in the 
absence of China’s clarification since China did not appear before the 
Tribunal. However, beyond public expectation, the Tribunal is so deter-
mined that it has competence to deal with the question i.e. whether or 
not there exists other maritime claims beyond UNCLOS 1982. 
Before giving the answer to this question, the Tribunal has already 
indicated its understanding that in one hand China claims historic rights 
to the living and non-living resources in the waters of the South China 
Sea within the ‘nine-dash line’, but on the other hand China does not 
consider that those waters form part of its territorial sea or internal wa-
ters (other than the territorial sea generated by islands). According to 
the Tribunal, such a claim would not be incompatible with the Conven-
tion insofar as the areas are within China’s exclusive economic zone 
and continental shelf. However, to the extent that China’s claim to his-
toric rights extends to areas that would be considered to form part of 
the entitlement of the Philippines to an exclusive economic zone or 
continental shelf, it would be at least at variance with the Convention.8
The Tribunal further declared that by acceding to the Convention 
and its entry into force, any historic rights that China may have had to 
the living and non-living resources within the ‘nine-dash line’ were su-
7  As explained by Prof Hasjim Djalal to the Author, 2015. 
8  Para 232 of the Award
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perseded, as a matter of law and as between the Philippines and China, 
by the limits of the maritime zones provided for by the Convention.9 
The rule is without exception and has been known to all Parties since 
the Convention was a package that did not, and could not, fully reflect 
any State’s prior understanding of its maritime rights. Accession to the 
Convention reflects a commitment to bring incompatible claims into 
alignment with its provisions, and its continued operation necessarily 
calls for compromise by those States with prior claims in excess of the 
Convention’s limits.
The Tribunal made an interesting finding with regard to what it 
understood about China’s historic rights. In the Tribunal’s view, what 
China claimed as historic rights was nothing but the freedom of the 
high seas that it had. Under the previous regime, nearly all of the South 
China Sea formed part of the high seas. The international community 
has then determined to convert the highs seas to the EEZ where China 
gained a greater degree of control. Only China’s freedom to navigate 
the South China Sea remains unaffected. What China enjoyed, as it has 
claimed, such as  navigation and trade in the South China Sea, as well as 
fishing beyond the territorial sea, represented the exercise of high seas 
freedoms. China engaged in activities that were permitted to all States 
by international law, as did the Philippines and other littoral States sur-
rounding the South China Sea.
From this perspective, the Tribunal is of the view that China’s rati-
fication of the Convention did not actually extinguish historic rights 
in the waters of the South China Sea. Rather, China relinquished the 
freedoms of the high seas that it had previously had. In this regard, the 
Tribunal tried to reformulate historic rights as understood by China in a 
more accurate context.
In its dispositif paragraph the Tribunal declares that, as between the 
Philippines and China, China’s claims to historic rights, or other sov-
ereign rights or jurisdiction, with respect to the maritime areas of the 
South China Sea encompassed by the relevant part of the ‘nine-dash 
line’ are contrary to the Convention and without lawful effect to the 
extent that they exceed the geographic and substantive limits of China’s 
maritime entitlements under the Convention; and further declares that 
9  Para 262 of the Award.
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the Convention superseded any historic rights, or other sovereign rights 
or jurisdiction, in excess of the limits imposed therein.10 By this legal 
determination the so-called ‘historic rights” as claimed by China has no 
basis under the Convention.
B. MARITIME STATUS OF DISPUTED FEATURES
Second, the Tribunal proceeded to determine whether the maritime 
features questioned by the Philippines are islands, rocks, reefs or just 
low tide elevation. The determination of their maritime status will clar-
ify the respective claim, especially whether or not they may generate 12 
Nm territorial sea (rocks) or in addition to it 200 Nm EEZ/continental 
shelf (islands), or otherwise they are not at al entitled to maritime zones 
(low tide elevation)11.
Before determining this characterization, the Tribunal interpreted 
the Convention with a view of seeking a guiding principle. The Tribu-
nal considers that the Convention requires that the status of a feature be 
ascertained on the basis of its earlier, natural condition, prior to the on-
set of significant human modification. The Tribunal will therefore reach 
its decision on the basis of the best available evidence of the previous 
status of what are now heavily modified coral reefs.12
The first exercise is then making distinction between low tide eleva-
tion and high tide elevation. The latter will constitute rocks or islands. 
In dealing with this characterization, the Tribunal was encountered with 
a technical determination of whether a particular feature is or is not 
above water at high tide. The two situation will determine which were 
low tide elevation and which are not. The most accurate determination, 
according to the Tribunal,  would be based on a combination of meth-
ods, including potentially direct, in-person observation covering an ex-
tended period of time across a range of weather and tidal conditions. 
Such direct observation, however, will often be impractical for remote 
features or, as in the present case, impossible where human modifica-
10  Para 1203 (B) (2) of the Award.
11  It has been held by various international decisions that low tide elevations are not 
subject to title over islands and shall be regarded as parts of the maritime zone. The 
ownership will depend on who own the maritime zones that covering the elevations.
12  Para 306 of the Award.
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tions have obscured the original status of a feature or where political 
considerations restrict in-person observation. The Tribunal considers 
it important that the absence of full information not be permitted to 
bar the conclusions that reasonably can be drawn on the basis of other 
evidence. At the same time, the limitations inherent in other forms of 
evidence must be acknowledged.13
Having distinguished the low tide elevation from the high tide, the 
Tribunal proceeded to the second exercise i.e. making distinction be-
tween rocks and islands by interpreting Article 121 of the Convention 
concerning regime of islands.14 The critical element of Article 121 for 
the Tribunal is its paragraph (3), which provides that “[r]ocks which 
cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own shall 
have no exclusive economic zone or continental shelf.”
 In this regard, the Tribunal did not rely on the name given to them. 
A feature may have “Island” or “Rock” in its name and nevertheless be 
entirely submerged. Conversely a feature with “Reef” or “Shoal” in its 
name may have protrusions that remain exposed at high tide. Likewise, 
the fact that feature is currently not inhabited does not prove that it is 
uninhabitable. The fact that it has no economic life does not prove that 
it cannot sustain an economic life.15
In interpreting Article 121(3), the Tribunal drew the following 
propositions:16
1. First, the use of the term “rock” does not require that a feature be 
composed of rock in the geologic sense in order to fall within the 
13  Para 321 of the Award.
14  Article 121 of the UNCLOS 1982
Regime of islands
1.  An island is a naturally formed area of land, surrounded by water, which is above 
water at high tide.
2.  Except as provided for in paragraph 3, the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the 
exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf of an island are determined in 
accordance with the provisions of this Convention applicable to other land terri-
tory.
3.  Rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own shall 
have no exclusive economic zone or continental shelf.
15  Para 483 of the Award.
16  Para 504 of the Award.
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scope of the provision.  
2. Second, the use of the term “cannot” makes clear that the provi-
sion concerns the objective capacity of the feature to sustain human 
habitation or economic life. Actual habitation or economic activity 
at any particular point in time is not relevant, except to the extent 
that it indicates the capacity of the feature.  
3. Third, the use of the term “sustain” indicates both time and qualita-
tive elements. Habitation and economic life must be able to extend 
over a certain duration and occur to an adequate standard.  
4. Fourth, the logical interpretation of the use of the term “or” dis-
cussed above indicates that a feature that is able to sustain either 
human habitation or an economic life of its own will be entitled to 
an exclusive economic zone and continental shelf. 
Using the above mentioned guiding principle and criteria, the Tribu-
nal then examined the maritime feature under consideration and made 
a legal determination. The most important determination is that none of 
the features met criteria as ‘islands’ and thus none of them is entitled to 
exclusive economic zone or continental shelf. =
In a more specific determination, the Tribunal declares that some 
features, despite they are naturally formed areas of land, surrounded by 
water, which are above water at high tide, but they are in their natural 
conditions are rocks that cannot sustain human habitation or economic 
life of their own, within the meaning of Article 121(3). These are Scar-
borough Shoal, Gaven Reef (North), McKennan Reef, Johnson Reef, 
Cuarteron Reef, and Fiery Cross Reef. They are entitled to 12 Nm ter-
ritorial sea.
Some others are low-tide elevation within the meaning of Article 13 
of the Convention.  These are Subi Reef, Gaven Reef (South), Hughes 
Reef, Mischief Reef, and Second Thomas Shoal. Generally they do not 
generate entitlements to a territorial sea, exclusive economic zone, or 
continental shelf and are not features that are capable of appropriation. 
As for Subi Reef, Gaven Reef (South), Hughes Reef, they may be used 
as the baseline for measuring the breadth of the territorial sea because 
they lie within 12 Nm of high tide features of,  respectively,  Sandy Cay, 
Gaven Reef (North) and Namyit Island, McKennan Reef and Sin Cowe 
Island. 
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With respect to Scarborough Shoal, the Tribunal made additional 
characterization to this feature by declaring that it has been a traditional 
fishing ground for fishermen of many nationalities. With this newly-
confirmed status, the Tribunal thus determined that China has, through 
the operation of its official vessels at Scarborough Shoal from May 
2012 onwards, unlawfully prevented fishermen from the Philippines 
from engaging in traditional fishing at Scarborough Shoal.  
C. ACTIVITIES OF CHINA IN RECLAIMED FEATURES
The third cluster of disputes is concerning the activities of China. 
The Tribunal dealt with question whether or not by construction and 
fishing in the specific disputed areas China has interfered with the exer-
cise of the Philippines’ sovereign rights and freedoms and have harmed 
the marine environment.
The question is mainly about he protection and preservation of the 
marine environment in the South China Sea as envisaged by the UN-
CLOS 1982. In this regard the Tribunal declares that China has breached 
its obligations under Articles 123, 192, 194(1), 194(5), 197, and 206 of 
the Convention.
III. WHAT THE TRIBUNAL RULING HAS CHANGED
Notwithstanding the juridical fact that the Tribunal Award does 
not, and is not intended to, solve the core dispute concerning title to 
maritime features, the Award has changed significantly the nature of 
respective claim of the claimant States over the features as well as wa-
ters in South China Sea. Although the Award, under Art 11 Annex VII 
UNCLOS, shall be complied with by the parties to the dispute only, 
the Tribunal interpretation of certain UNCLOS provisions has clarified 
their meaning and thus removed the controversy that so far attached to 
the dispute amongst other claimant States.
The first significant change is the removal of  legal ambiguity un-
derlining the overlapping claims. Not only claimant States but also all 
coastal States in the regions which had suffered from the dispute have 
been freed from the ambiguity of the so-called “9 dash line”. Prior to 
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the Award, there was no legal explanation concerning the meaning of 
the line since China’s approach to this controversial ‘historic rights’ 
was to keep it ambiguous. The prominent Chinese legal scholars made 
it clear that as no delimitation of maritime boundaries would be pos-
sible without settling sovereignty disputes over islands and reefs in 
question, thus maintaining ambiguity on the maritime claims might be 
the best choice for the moment. They further stated that any attempt to 
clarify the dash line would only lead to an escalation.17 This might be 
the main reason why China was so reluctant to explain the legal nature 
of the claim albeit being frequently sought by many States. On the other 
hand,  Chinese scholars might have different views thus discouraging 
the Government to issue the legal position.
This ambiguity had exacerbated the complexity of the already-com-
plicated dispute. The real picture of the dispute in South China Sea had 
been mainly shadowed by this mysterious line and to some extent it 
had posed stagnancy and thus barred any effort for the resolution of the 
dispute. The situation became worst since China was not merely draw-
ing the line in the map but recently also articulating and even enforcing 
the line on the ground (waters). These moves have created tension and 
given rise to a security dilemma18 in the region by which all claimant 
States try to assert and consolidate their respective claims with a view 
of diminishing other claimant claims. Occupying and reclaiming the 
features are considered by them as the best mode for consolidating their 
title, notwithstanding that most legal scholars will argue that this mode 
will never work for acquisition of territories.   
The Tribunal Award removed the line from the map and therefore 
the geographical scope of the claim becomes clearer. In this regard, 
the line shall no longer serve as a legal basis not only for claiming the 
17  Fu YingWu Shicun, ‘South China Sea: How We Got to This Stage’, The National 
Interest, 9 May 2016, can accessed at  http://nationalinterest.org/feature/south-china-
sea-how-we-got-stage-16118?page=show
18  Jervis, R. “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma,” World Politics vol. 30, no.2 
(January 1978), pp. 167–174; and Jervis, R. Perception and Misperception in Inter-
national Politics(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1978), pp. 58–113. See 
also Agusman and Nugroho, ‘SCS Dispute: Security Dilemma Revival?”, Jakarta Post 
7 March 2016, can be accessed at http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2016/03/07/
scs-dispute-security-dilemma-revival.html
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waters surrounded but also for claiming the title over the features being 
disputed. The removal of the line from the picture does not necessary 
mean that China has totally lost ground for claiming the features. It 
does only mean that China shall seek other more legitimate basis for 
claiming the features within the ambit of modes of acquisitions of ter-
ritory recognized under international law.  With other claimant States, 
China shall reformulate the claim and adjust it to the prevailing inter-
national law taking into account those prohibited rules as interpreted by 
the Tribunal.
As explained above, the Tribunal is not designed, and is not autho-
rized by the Convention,  to solve the sovereignty issues i.e. title to mar-
itime features in South China Sea. The resolution of this very dispute 
is left to the claimant States to decide. Thus, while the Award does not 
touch the title over the features i.e. ‘which features belong to whom’, 
it is the responsibility of claimant States to solve the dispute through 
peaceful means. The Tribunal Award only paves a way for further solu-
tion. The claimant States shall further proceed to negotiate in a view of 
finding solution. They are free to choose the mode of dispute settlement 
either through direct negotiations or through third party settlement in-
cluding judicial settlement through international courts. 
In International Law, territorial dispute or title to ‘islands’ is con-
sidered as one of the most complicated case. The history has recorded 
that this kind of dispute is hardly solved through negotiations between 
the claimant States, because the absolutist positions and sovereign pride 
over their claimed territories would normally close the room for the 
abandonment of the claim. In the negotiation, the claimant states nor-
mally will encounter with the win-loose dilemma, which are irreconcil-
able.19 It clearly explains why in practice the dispute over title to territo-
ries is increasingly, albeit with reluctantly, settled through a third party 
settlement mechanism or otherwise to keep the dispute unresolved.20
Southeast Asian countries have a better experience in settling dis-
19  Damos Dumoli Agusman, “Conflict Prevention and the Rule of Law: Reassess-
ing the South China Sea Conundrum in the 21st Century – Progress and Prospect,” 
presented at the 4th MIMA South China Sea Conference 2015, Kuala Lumpur, 8-9 
August 2015.
20  Id.
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putes over title to territory, whether through negotiations or through a 
third party settlement. Thailand and Cambodia settled their land title 
dispute over the Temple of Preah Vihear (ICJ/1962)21, Indonesia and 
Malaysia over Sipadan and Ligitan Islands (ICJ/2002)22, Malaysia and 
Singapore over Pedra Branca (ICJ/2008)23, and also the case by their 
predecessors between the Netherlands and the USA over the Island of 
Palmas/Miangas (Arbitration/1928).24 On the other hand, on the North-
east Asian scope, there is no record of dispute over territory is settled 
through third party and yet there is a number of title disputes left unre-
solved.25
The second significant change is concerning the geographical mari-
time scope of the respective claims. As the Tribunal confirms that none 
of the disputed features is entitled to EEZ/continental shelf, the status 
of waters becomes clearer. Before the Award, no legal determination 
whether the features they claim might generate maritime zone up to 
200 Nm. They tended to regard the features they claim as fully entitled 
islands and thus attaching to their claim the assumption, as a default, 
that the features had their own EEZ/continental shelf. 
Since there is no feature under consideration entitled to EEZ/con-
tinental shelf, EEZ or continental shelf in South China Sea is only de-
rived and drawn from the mainland of the respective claimant States. 
The configuration of the maritime zones has changed significantly and 
given space to high seas in between opposite claimant States. Claim-
ant States which adjacent one to another shall delimit their territorial 
21  Case concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand), Jugdment of 
15 June 1962, available at:  http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?sum=284&p1=3
&p2=3&case=45&p3=5.
22  Case concerning Sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan (Indonesia v. 
Malaysia), available at: http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/102/10570.pdf.
23  Case concerning Sovereignty over Pedra Branca/Pulau Batu Puteh, Middle Rocks 
and South Ledge (Malaysia  v. Singapore), available at: http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/
files/130/14492.pdf.
24  Reports of International Arbitral Awards, Island of Palmas case (Netherlands v. 
USA), 4 April 1928, Volume II pp. 829-871, available at: http://legal.un.org/riaa/cas-
es/vol_II/829-871.pdf.
25  For instance: the Liancourt/Dokdo between Japan and South Korea; Senkaku/Di-
aoyudau Island between Japan and China, and the dispute concerning maritime fea-
tures in South China Sea.
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sea and EEZ/continental shelf and to be effected through agreements. 
Some features, with the 12 Nm territorial sea, will scatter and lie within 
the EEZ/continental shelf drawn from the main coast and some of them 
within the high seas.
Courtesy of Mr Bensurto
The third significant change, and arguably is the most delicate one, 
is that the core dispute has been partially solved. The Tribunal finds 
that Mischief Reef and Second Thomas Shoal are low-tide elevations 
not capable of appropriation, and they are within the exclusive eco-
nomic zone and continental shelf of the Philippines. By this ruling, the 
two features are not subject to be disputed since they form part of the 
maritime zone and they lie uncontested within the Philippines EEZ/
Continental Shelf. In this regard, the maritime status of the two features 
is hereby determined as belong to the Philippines and shall be taken out 
from the ‘disputed box’.
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IV. IMPLICATION OF THE TRIBUNAL AWARD ON INDONESIA
It has been a long standing position that Indonesia is not part of the 
dispute26. Indonesia is not claimant States in the South China Sea dis-
pute, simply because Indonesia does not claim any feature in the area 
and no state claims any feature within Indonesia’s South China Waters 
waters.27 
Some doubts had been raised in 1990’s whether or not China claimed 
the Natunal island following the disclosure of China’s 9 dash lines in 
1993. The doubt has been removed since Foreign Minister Qian Qichen 
in 1995, in respond to Foreign Minister Ali Alatas question, clarified 
that China has no claim over Natuna islands.28 Similar confirmation has 
also been acquired by Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi from Foreign 
Minister Wang Yi in their informal meeting on 3 June 2016 in Paris. 
The complexity of the dispute to some extent has confused Indo-
nesian pubic about the position of Indonesia vis a vis the dispute. The 
position of Indonesia has thus been understood differently and diverse-
ly amongst Indonesian public. The 9-dashed-line, one of which en-
croached the waters in the vicinity of Indonesia’s Natuna Islands, had 
(mis) led some officials to assert that there was an overlapping claim 
between Indonesia and China.29 Actually there is no geographical da-
tum attaching to the 9 dash line so no one could be sure where exactly 
the lines are located. Apparently, some have argued that it encroached 
part of Natuna waters and came to a conclusion that, as if, Indonesia 
had dispute with China over maritime in the waters. This fact has lent 
to a convincing reason that Indonesia is a claimant state. 
26  The position has been recently reiterated by President Jokowi during the ASEAN 
Summit in Kuala Lumpur, 22 November 2015.
27  Natuna Archipelago is within Indonesia’s waters but geographically also a part of 
South China Sea.  
28  Official correspondence is on file with the author.
29  The debate was on the for following a public statement by Mr. Fahru Zaini, Senior 
Official of the Coordinating Ministery for Political, Legal, and Security Affairs (Men-
kopolhukam): “China has claimed Natuna waters as their territorial waters. This ar-
bitrary claim is related to the dispute over Spratly and Paracel Islands between China 
and the Philippines. This dispute will have a large impact on the security of Natuna 
waters”, see Evan Laksmana, “Why there is no ‘new maritime dispute’ between Indo-
nesia and China,” the Strategist, 4 April 2014, available at: http://www.aspistrategist.
org.au/why-there-is-no-new-maritime-dispute-between-indonesia-and-china/.
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Claiming that Indonesia is a claimant state simply on the ground 
that it has overlapping maritime claim with China, if any, in the South 
China Sea is not very convincing for the following reasons. First, the 
notion ‘claimant states’ mostly refers to overlapping claim over title 
to islands, not to overlapping claim to maritime zones. Indonesia has 
overlapping maritime zones in entire bordering areas with all its neigh-
bours and hardly been referred to as ‘claimant state’. Indonesia was a 
claimant State when it had dispute since 1969 with Malaysia over Si-
padan and Ligitan Islands, which had been then solved by ICJ in 2002 
in favour of Malaysia.
Second, whether Indonesia has overlapping claim with China could 
not be determined simply and merely by the fact that there exists one 
of the dash line within Indonesia’s waters. In this regard, Indonesia has 
persistently protested the lines including President Joko Widodo who 
recently stated that Chinese 9 dash line has no legal basis.30   Likewise, 
many States have make similar protest to the China’s 9 -dash line-map. 
In this circumstance, considering that the map has violated UNCLOS 
1982, the problem arising from the line should not be regarded as either 
between claimant states or between bilateral contexts only, but it should 
be the problem of all parties to UNCOS 1982.
 In order to constitute that there is an overlapping claim, China 
should have a good basis for making a proper claim that legitimately 
opposes to Indonesia’s claim over the maritime zone. On the part of In-
donesia, it has under UNCLOS 1982 a legitimate claim over 200 Nm of 
EEZ/continental measured from its baselines.  On the part of China, it is 
hardly tenable to assert its claim on the basis of 9 dash line since the line 
has no foundation in international law. In this circumstance, asserting 
that there is a dispute between Indonesia and China over the maritime 
zone is legally unfounded. 
The ambiguity of the 9 dash line that appeared in Natuna waters 
had to some extent created uncomfortable situation between the two 
Countries. Although both Parties succeeded in managing the ‘differ-
30  See “Indonesia’s President says China has no legal claim to South China Sea: Yo-
miuri,”  The Straits Times, 23 March 2015, available at: http://www.straitstimes.com/
asia/se-asia/indonesias-president-jokowi-says-china-has-no-legal-claim-to-south-
china-sea-yomiuri.
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ences’, and China’s approach tends to shelve the issue undiscussed, the 
potential tension was not fading away. Indonesia persistently lodged its 
official protest to the China’s 9 dash line  map and kept asking about the 
meaning of the line. 
Until recently, China had only put the line on its map and rarely ex-
ecuted the line on the ground. In 2013 China apparently started articu-
lating its claim on the basis of its  line in the part of Indonesia. Some in-
cidents occurred in Natuna waters where Chinese fishing vessels were 
encountered by Indonesian legal enforcement. The incidents were then 
being managed discreetly without public exposure.    Following the new 
approach pursued by President Joko Widodo since his office in 2014, 
particularly with his strongest measures against IUU fishing, the mas-
sive legal enforcement against illegal fishing by the new Administration 
has resulted three consecutive arrests of Chinese fishing vessels in Na-
tuna waters (within the 9 dash line) in the period of March-June 2016 
and created open and diplomatic tension between the two Countries.
The diplomatic interactions between the two Governments in han-
dling the incident brought about a new argument to the ‘historic rights’. 
Having being silent on the ‘mysterious 9 dash line claim’, it was for the 
first time China made an unprecedented open and public claim that it 
has “differences’ (instead of ‘dispute”) with Indonesia in Natuna wa-
ters. China introduced a new claim in the old casing called “traditional 
fishing ground”31. Again the claim is stated unexplained by Chinese au-
thority. 
Fortunately,  the incidents occurred in the time when the Tribunal 
was at its session. As explained above, the Tribunal Award has con-
firmed that the line as well as any so-called ‘historic rights’ outside the 
Convention is not valid. It declares that the Convention superseded any 
historic rights, or other sovereign rights or jurisdiction, in excess of the 
limits imposed therein. In a specific argument, the Tribunal has clearly 
expressed its view that no such historic rights extends to EEZ or conti-
nental shelf.32 The ruling constitutes a sweeping formula for supersed-
31  The notion “Traditional Fishing Ground” raised by China in Natuna warters is 
discussed by M. Taylor Fravel in “Traditional Fishing Grounds and China’s Historic 
Rights Claims in the South China Sea”,  Maritime Awarnes Project, July 11, 2016
32  Para 239 of the Award.
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ing what China asserted as “traditional fishing ground” in Indonesia’s 
Natuna EEZ. 
The controversy arising from the line has since the Tribunal ruling 
apparently faded away from the public debate. The question then arises 
whether the Award may be invoked by Indonesia in order to prevent 
China from making any claim on the basis of the 9 dash line. In this 
regard, there is no doubt that the award shall be complied with by the 
parties to the dispute.33 Indonesia is not the party to the dispute and as 
such is not entitled to invoke the Award. Traditional approach however 
suggests that the judicial decisions such as the Award of the Tribunal 
may enter into jurisprudence (case law) and thus could be invoked by 
States other than the Parties to the dispute. It this regard, the Award 
binds other States by virtue of jurisprudence (case law). 
Nevertheless the Author would prefer to argue beyond this tradi-
tional approach and in favour of the view that Indonesia may invoke the 
Award directly.34 The Tribunal in dealing with this particular case is not 
only making adjudication to the Parties, but also interpreting the provi-
sions of UNCLOS 1982 particularly Article 55-75 concerning EEZ and 
Article 121 concerning the regime of islands. As a party to the UN-
CLOS 1982, Indonesia is bound by its provisions. Since the provisions 
have been interpreted by the Tribunal, Indonesia shall be bound by the 
provisions as interpreted by the Tribunal including the provisions that 
superseded historic rights/9 dash line. Arguing that the interpreted pro-
visions only bind the parties to the dispute would be indefensible and 
could create legal chaotic. It would be unsound to argue that the 9 dash 
line is invalid in the Philippines waters by virtue of the Award but in the 
same time remains valid or undecided in the Natuna waters. 
Therefore, the Award removes doubt concerning status of Indonesia 
as non claimant State. The Award confirmed that no overlapping claim 
may arise between Indonesia and China in Natuna waters. In this regard, 
even before the Tribunal issuing its Award, the Minister of Foreign Af-
fairs Retno Marsudi of Indonesia has make it clear that in the Natuna 
33  Article 11 Annex VII, UNCLOS 1982.
34  Damos Dumoli Agusman, “International Norms and Rules: Lesson Learned from 
Indonesia”, at the Second Manila Conference on the South China Sea”, 3 – 4 August 
2016.
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waters Indonesia has overlapping maritime zone only with Vietnam and 
Malaysia, so to exclude China.35 In Indonesia’s view, the Award merely 
confirms its long established understanding concerning the line.
From the law of the sea perspective, there would be a potential mari-
time claim involving Indonesia in the South China Sea if there was 
island entitled to 200 maritime zone lie within less than 400 Nm from 
Indonesian outermost island i.e. Natuna island. One of the features un-
der Tribunal consideration is Cuarteroon Reef, which is about 377 Nm 
from Natuna island. Fortunately, the Tribunal finds that the Reef is a 
rock which is not entitled to 200 Nm maritime zone and thus cannot 
overlap waters within Natuna maritime zone. The Tribunal has there-
fore removed the uncertainty arising from Cuarteroon Reef. 
Another possible overlapping claim on the UNCLOS-friendly basis 
had also been raised by Chinese Scholar,  Xue Manyi36, who argued 
that the Vanguard Bank (claimed by China but occupied by Vietnam) 
which located in a distant of 185 Nm from Natuna may constitute over-
lapping maritime zone with Indonesia in Natuna waters. The argument 
came out in respond to the incident of 19 March 2016 when Indonesia’s 
Coastguard arrested Chinese fishing vessel in Natuna waters in a dis-
tant of about 76 Nm from Vanguard Bank. This kind of argument has 
however been overruled by the Tribunal Award. The status of Vanguard 
Bank is not bigger than the features under Tribunal consideration and 
therefore it is hardly entitled to maritime zone 
V. CONCLUSION
The Tribunal Award as summary explained above has been consid-
ered as an unprecedented  landmark judicial decision that has changed 
significantly the configuration of dispute in South China Sea. Albeit not 
solving the real core dispute,  the Award at least has successfully clari-
fied the dispute,  put the distinguishable elements in the proper setting, 
and presented the dispute in a clearer picture. Put it in Mr Bensurto’s 
35  The Annual Press Statement of the Indonesia Minister for Foreign Affairs, 7 Janu-
ary 2016. It can be accessed at http://www.kemlu.go.id/en/pidato/menlu/Pages/The-
Annual-Press-Statement-of-the-Indonesian-Minister-for-Foreign-Affairs-2016.aspx
36  Xue Manyi, Phoenix Magazine, 22 March 2016. 
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words, the Award has successfully unlocked the gridlock37 in South 
China Sea.  
The Tribunal apparently did not only adjudicate the case before it 
but also exercise its authority under UNCLOS 1982 to interpret the 
provisions of the Convention relevant to the case. By doing so, the Tri-
bunal has provided clarification to some provisions that until recently 
their meaning had been debated. The interpretation of the Tribunal of 
the Convention apparently becomes the most important  aspect in this 
Award since the dispute is not merely concerning the interest of the par-
ties to the dispute but also affects the interest of other claimant States as 
well as other interested States. 
The Award has significantly changed the configuration of the dispute 
in South China Sea. First it removed the ambiguity of so called ‘historic 
rights within 9 dash line’ claimed by China by  declaring that the line is 
not compatible with the UNCLOS 1982. Second, it clarified maritime 
features by providing sweeping ruling,  on the basis of its interpretation 
of Article 121 UNCLOS 1982,  that none of them is entitled to gener-
ate the maritime zone (EEZ/continental shelf) up to 200 Nm. The two 
distinguished but interrelated rulings have perfectly removed distorted 
claims and thus narrowed the geographical scope of the dispute.
It is also argued that in fact the Tribunal Award has partially solved 
the core (sovereignty) dispute. By declaring the Mischief Reef and Sec-
ond Thomas Shoal (located within the Philippines EEZ) as low tide 
elevation, the ruling has ended the contention concerning title to these 
features. The two are not capable for appropriation and therefore taken 
out from the list of disputed features. On the other hand, the newly-
determined status of these feature poses complexity about its enforce-
ment on the ground. China has carried out reclamation and constructing 
airstrip in Mischief Reef. The remain presence of China in the Reef is as 
such constituting violation the Award and might create possible tension 
between the partied to the dispute.
Indonesia is not a claimant State to the dispute and has persistently 
opposed to any discourse that there exists overlapping maritime claim 
37  Henry Bensurto, “15 Paths to Peace: Unlock the Gridlock in SCS”, paper presented 
at the Second Manila Conference on the South China Sea”, 3 – 4 August 2016.
150 Volume 14 Number 2 January 2017
Jurnal Hukum Internasional
with China. The Tribunal Award especially on its ruling that annulling 
the 9 dash line is therefore nothing but confirming this long standing 
position. On the other part, the Award has also removed possible doubt 
about whether or not there exists feature in nearby that might possibly 
overlap the Natuna waters. By finding that none of the features is eli-
gible to generate EEZ/continental shelf, the Award confirms that none 
of them will possibly encroach the Natuna waters. 
As Indonesia is bound by the provisions of the UNCLOS 1982, it 
is also automatically bound by the provisions as interpreted by the Tri-
bunal. Thus Indonesia may capitalize the Award for its legal defence in 
dealing with Natuna waters.  In this circumstance Indonesia is a “lucky 
beneficiary” of the Award.
